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equalizing charges for terminating calls, reciprocity eliminates differences between
internal and cross-network prices and makes monopoly less likely. Imputation
counteracts an incentive by the dominant network to “price squeeze” a rival by
eliminating differences in the wholesale price of termination and the implicit price
for internal use. By increasing profits of rival networks and increasing their
subscribers' surplus, imputation supports additional entry. Finally, an unbundling
rule reduces termination fees charged by a dominant network that was engaging
in pure bundling. Again, entry will be facilitated as rival networks offer potential
subscribers a more attractive rate schedule.
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1. PRO-COMPETITIVE PRICING POLICIES
In an effort to realize the potential of advances in telecommunications technology, policy
makers around the world have set aside policies of heavy handed regulation and chosen instead
to encourage entry by new providers. Success of these pro-competitive policies depend on the
absence of significant barriers to entry into markets which have long been dominated by
incumbent carriers. Many of these barriers are erected by established carriers who have
substantial investments in embedded plant and equipment and widely recognized brand names.
Importantly, users may prefer to remain with the incumbent providers rather than forgo the
benefits of demand-side scale economies, commonly called “network externalities.”
Policy makers are suspicious that dominant carriers will use their natural advantages to
harm competition. To begin with, it is likely that an incumbent network will set monopoly prices
for its bottleneck services. These services include network components that are only available
from the incumbent, are needed by other carriers to provide services, but are prohibitively
expensive to replicate. Control of such facilities offers the incumbent an opportunity to engage
in a “price squeeze” of a rival carrier by pricing the essential inputs higher than it implicitly
charges itself for internal use. Market power can also be expressed by discriminatory prices for
final services that vary with the threat of competition, thereby tapping protected markets to
subsidize production for competitive markets. Finally, an incumbent carrier could simply refuse
to interconnect with fledgling networks, denying them access to its large customer base.
Historically, regulators have been hostile to carriers' refusals to interconnect with
competitors. But while mandatory interconnection is quite universal, it does not completely
eliminate incumbents' advantages. They could still use their control over the terms, conditions
and rates for interconnection so as to exclude rival carriers. Fearful of this possibility, regulators
have adopted various pricing rules intended to neutralize the advantages and anticompetitive
practices of incumbent carriers. These include reciprocal pricing (and its close cousin, the “bill
and keep” arrangement), imputation, and unbundling.
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State commissions have been experimenting with policies of this sort for some time. The
Congress has recently embodied several pricing rules in the terms of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996. The Act requires local exchange carriers to provide transmission and termination on
a reciprocal basis with competing local exchange carriers (LECs) at rates that approximate costs,1
and allows carriers to adopt bill and keep arrangements.2 When selling network services that
it uses itself, the law also requires a local exchange carrier to impute charges to its services no
less than the amount it charges an unaffiliated carrier.3 The Act demands that a LEC's network
elements be unbundled from more aggregated offerings, and sold at just, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory rates, terms and conditions.4 Throughout the Act there are calls for
nondiscriminatory access and pricing of network services. In particular, LECs are required to
extend interconnection to competing carriers and to offer unbundled network elements at
nondiscriminatory rates.5
These policies were adopted in the rush to deregulate telecommunications markets.
Understandably, little is known about how such rules perform in practice. They have been
imposed in the U.S. and elsewhere, however, without a full theoretical analysis of their effects.
In this paper, we attempt to gain a better understanding of the theoretical implications of these
rules, focusing first on reciprocity and then examining imputation and unbundling.
Reciprocity in the interconnection fees requires that all networks charge the same amount
to terminate calls coming from other networks. The intent of this policy is to prevent incumbent
networks from limiting the growth of smaller rivals by charging exorbitant fees to terminate their
traffic. Moreover, as a regulatory tool, reciprocity is easier to implement, since it has only minor
informational requirements, in contrast with other schemes. Under a version of reciprocity—the
“bill-and-keep” system—termination fees are set to zero: each carrier simply collects all revenue
from calls made by its subscribers, paying nothing to the terminating network. The rationale for
1 §251(b)(5), §252(d)(2), §271(c)(2)(B)(xiii)
2 §252(d)(2)(B)
3 §272(e)(3)
4 §251(c)(3), §271(c)(2)(B)(iv)-(vi)
5 §251(c)(2)(D), §251(c)(3)
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bill and keep is the reduction of transaction costs, especially when balanced traffic flows would
result in negligible net payments for termination.
Imputation rules are designed to eliminate any markup on service components sold to
competing firms over and above the implicit charges for internal use. Imputation is designed to
make it difficult, although not impossible, to execute a price squeeze on a rival who needs access
to a dominant network's facilities.
“Bundling” is a network pricing practice that has received much scrutiny. It is believed
that, by selling network components only in combination with each other, a dominant network
could erect a barrier to entry by firms needing only a subset of the components. By requiring
the dominant network to “unbundle” its services, and to quote “reasonable” prices for the
constituent components, entry barriers should be reduced.
In this paper we describe a simple model of competition between two networks where one
network may have a strategic advantage over the other. As a benchmark, we first analyze the
strategically symmetric case, where the networks set their prices simultaneously. Next, we turn
to the case where one network has a strategic advantage in terms of being a first mover in setting
prices. At the non-cooperative equilibrium, the dominant network is able to steer the outcome
in its favor, possibly excluding its rival altogether. Then we examine how pricing rules such as
reciprocity, imputation and unbundling alter the different equilibria.
Generally, reciprocity raises consumer welfare without reducing industry profits by
inducing a dominant network to lower its termination charge. Results are more ambiguous when
we impose exact imputation on a dominant network. This policy has the effect of shifting profits
from a dominant firm to its rival, but there is no guarantee that consumers will benefit in the
aggregate. The consequences of an unbundling policy are also indeterminate. While the profits
of the dominant network are reduced, it is unclear whether rival network profits will rise.
Nevertheless, both imputation and unbundling raise the welfare of the rival's subscribers which,
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in turn, should attract customers away from the dominant carrier and improve chances for viable
competition in these markets.
2. PRICE COMPETITION IN A NETWORK DUOPOLY
2.1 The Model
As a starting point we consider a duopoly model of perfect complementary products first
analyzed by Cournot (1838). In his model, each firm sets the price of one of two components
that are combined in fixed proportions to form a final good demanded by consumers. In
equilibrium, the final price exceeds the monopoly level. The reason is that each firm, having a
monopoly over its component, marks up price on its cost, which is just the price of the other
component (charged by the other firm). The existence of these two markups is often referred to
as “double marginalization.” Because each supplier only realizes profits from its component, it
fails to internalize the effect that a price increase will have on its rivals' profits. Both industry
profits and consumer surplus are sacrificed compared to their monopoly levels.
The Cournot model can be viewed as representing a simple telephone network where a
phone call is composed of an originating component combined with a terminating component.
We construct a model of two interconnected networks, each owned by one of the two carriers,
called 1 and 2. Some calls never leave the carrier's network, while others originate on one
network and terminate on another. Figure 1 indicates how calls are composed of one origination
component (indicated by the Ai's) and one termination component (the Bi's) supplied by either
of the two networks. Thus, each of the two networks sells three services: internal calls to its
subscribers, plus origination and termination services to be used in cross-network calls.
In general, consumers consider each call a substitute for other calls that may be made
within its own network, as well as across networks. For simplicity we assume that a user derives
utility only from placing calls, and not from receiving them. Furthermore, users show no
preference across which users they call; what matters is the charge to reach other parties.
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Let sij be the retail price for a call from network i to network j, where i and j take
values of either 1 or 2. Using this notation, sii, is the retail price for an internal call. Calls
from network i to network j, referred to as “cross-network” calls, consist of origination by
network i and termination by network j. The price for origination is given by pi while the
price for termination is qj. The retail price of cross-network calls is the simple sum of the
wholesale prices of its components: sij = pi + qj.
We model the interaction among the networks and the users as a two-stage game. In the
first stage, all users simultaneously make their subscription decisions. In the second stage, the
networks set their prices and the users decide on how many calls to make. Thus, the users
cannot change their subscription decision after observing the networks' prices. This game
structure aims at capturing situations where users are slower in changing network affiliation than
in varying the amount of phone calls they make as firms change prices: one can think of the
second stage of the game as the “short run” and of the first stage as the “long run.” There is
some empirical support that subscription decisions respond to price changes with a considerable
lag.6
We assume that, while there may be a cost to building a network to serve customers, the
cost is not sensitive to either the number of subscribers or their levels of usage. Realistically,
the marginal cost of operating a modern telecommunications networks is virtually nil. We also
make the assumption that the networks have the same cost structures.
We begin by considering the strategically symmetric case in which networks set their
prices simultaneously. In that case, the price of internal calls will be set at the monopoly level.7
This follows from the fact that, after choosing a carrier, each subscriber is “captive” to a network.
Cross-network calls, by comparison, are priced jointly by the two networks. Subscribers may still
be captive because they have only one alternative for making internal and external calls, but
6 Ward (1995) finds subscription behavior to be responsive to price differentials between AT&T and the other
long distance carriers only over the long run.
7 See Economides, Lopomo and Woroch (1996).
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unlike internal calls, a single network does not have complete control over the retail price of
cross-network calls. Double marginalization causes prices for incoming and outgoing calls to
exceed their monopoly levels, sijc = pic + qjc > sijm, where the “c” denotes the Cournot
equilibrium, and “m” denotes monopoly. Putting results for the two kinds of calls together gives
us an important conclusion: assuming costs of calls are identical, the price of cross-network calls
exceeds that for internal calls: siic = siim < sijc = pic + qjc.
The fact that, at equilibrium, networks charge less for internal calls than for outgoing
calls, resembles the so-called “calling circle” plans offered by long distance carriers. Under these
schemes, it is cheaper to call a fellow subscriber than someone on a rival network. For this
reason a subscriber's overall bill will be lower the more users who choose the same network since
then more calls are considered “internal.” In effect, the price structure creates a pecuniary
externality that acts like a direct “network externality.” In this last case a network having more
subscribers is seen as more valuable to a prospective subscriber because it offers more people
to connect with. Here, both networks are fully interconnected so a user can reach subscribers
of both networks.
Assuming that there is a degree of substitutability among calls, it can be shown that
originating charges exceed termination charges: pic > qjc.8 The reason is that the receiving
network is less inclined to raise the price of incoming calls. While they may be the source of
revenue, incoming calls are independent of other calls because, by assumption, subscribers only
value outgoing calls. However, by raising origination fees, a network is able to steer business
to internal calls for which it collects on both origination and termination charges. The
competition posed by outgoing calls contributes an increment to the existing price premium that
results from double marginalization.9
8 Ibid.
9 The larger of the two networks will also charge its customers more for outgoing calls than the smaller one
since, given the greater attraction of its larger size, it can do so without significantly curtailing revenues. See
Economides, Lopomo and Woroch (1996). More specifically, origination fees are increasing in the relative size of
the originating network: a larger network can command a higher percentage of the revenue from outgoing calls.
Likewise, termination fees are decreasing in the relative size of the terminating network.
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2.2 Network Dominance
Up to this point, we have treated the two networks symmetrically: not only have their
products and production costs been identical, but they also set prices simultaneously. In the
situation we seek to model, however, one network commands a dominant position. This position
could derive from its greater size (measured either by network investment or the number of
subscribers) and/or from having been around longer than its rivals. We capture this asymmetry
by simply having one network, say network 1, choose its termination charge before the opponent.
This could be a benefit of having a network in place before its rival, and the fact that a new
carrier needs to have an interconnection agreement in place before it starts business.
Commitment to service prices should give a strategic advantage to the first mover.10
As might be expected, a rebalancing of prices occurs when one carrier gains a first-mover
advantage over the other. Internal prices remain at monopoly levels for both networks: siid + siim
= sii
s where we use “d” to indicate that network 1 is dominant (i.e., a first mover). In addition,
calls that originate on the dominant carrier's network are unchanged from the simultaneous-mover
equilibrium: s12d = s12s.
The impact of a first-mover advantage is registered in the price of incoming calls. First
of all, the price of these calls increase:11 p2d + q1d > p2c + q1c. Here is where pricing restrictions
could improve upon the non-cooperative equilibrium. Second, the prices for origination and
termination are rebalanced in network 1’s favor: q1d > q1s and p2d < p2s. Effectively, the
dominant carrier commits to higher termination charges, squeezing the follower network by
increasing the price that the follower's subscribers must pay for outgoing calls, and taking a
larger proportion of the revenues from those calls.
3. DUOPOLY COMPETITION FOR SUBSCRIBERS
10 In some strategic settings there may be a second mover advantage. See Gal-Or (1985). These conditions do
not hold here.
11 Economides, Lopomo and Woroch (1996), op. cit.
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Whereas Cournot's early work supplied a model to analyze price competition between two
networks, we turn now to models of spatial competition in the Hotelling tradition to describe
competition for subscribers. Users have three subscription options: subscribe to one of the two
networks, or subscribe to neither. Subscribing to both networks is not an option. In making that
decision, users take into account three factors: prices charged by the two networks for internal
and outgoing calls, the value of money relative to phone calls, and finally, perceptions of the
relative “attractiveness” of the two networks.
This last factor is what Hotelling models of horizontal differentiation are designed to
capture. We think of users that “live” at each address along the continuum of characteristics that
lie between the positions of the two networks. A user's location indicates his ideal network
configuration. A departure from this ideal causes the user disutility when it compromises by
choosing one of the two networks. Of course, if the networks charged the same prices for the
same services, then each user would simply choose the “closest” of the two to minimize the
disutility. Disutility associated with a network position could simply arise from user perceptions
of service quality created over time and through advertising.12 Brand loyalty has been shown
to be an important determinant of users' choice of a carrier.13
Formally, the final utility from subscription and usage is:
Vti = Ui - λ t - ti
where Ui represents the derived utility from using network i at its prices for internal calls
(sii) and outgoing calls (sij). The second term measures the disutility of subscribing to network
i located at ti for a subscriber who is located at t. The proportionality factor λ scales
disutility according to the “distance” between the two locations.
12 This is most likely true for residential users. It may also be due to differences in compatibility between the
user's hardware and software and the technology adopted by the network. Especially in the case of sophisticated
business services, there are several competing technical standards which are not fully compatible with all customer
premise equipment.
13 Tardiff (1995) finds brand loyalty to be an important determinant of the choice of a long distance carrier by
Japanese consumers.
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In the first stage of the game, users choose to subscribe to one of the two networks, or
to not subscribe at all. When making their decisions, users correctly anticipate the prices that
will be realized in the subsequent stage of the game. This structure departs from the Hotelling's
approach where firms announce prices before users decide from whom to purchase.14 We
believe that, in the case of network services, it is more costly and more time consuming for users
to switch networks than it is for carriers to change prices.15
Carriers are unable to commit to prices before users make their subscription decisions.
An exception might be, for example, a firm may be able to commit to bundling that equalizes
prices for all components in the package while leaving open the price of the bundle itself.
Alternatively, regulatory policy could restrict prices before users make their subscription and
usage decisions. This paper is concerned with several of these rules. The issue is whether such
pricing rules restrain the exercise of market power by carriers, or whether they enhance it.
Because of the price premium on outgoing calls, and the associated benefits of a large
subscriber base, multiple equilibria are as likely here as they are with direct network externalities.
When deciding which network to join, a user must form expectations as to how many other users
will make the same choice since the worth of a network's discount depends on how many calls
will be internal. Several combinations of subscription decisions and network size expectations
form an equilibrium. In the extreme, the decision not to subscribe to either network is an
equilibrium for all users when every consumer believes no one else will subscribe to either
network.
When making their choice of a network, users will pay close attention to relative prices
for internal and external calls because the difference determines the size of the “calling circle
discount,” and hence, how attractive it is to join a network. However, joining the larger network
is not the only consideration of a subscriber. Users must also take account of the disutility they
14 Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1996) adopt the traditional sequence of decisions.
15 See footnote 6 supra.
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experience from subscribing to a less-than-ideal network. The disutility of making a compromise
can be so large that not subscribing to either network is the preferred alternative. When users
attach little weight to differences between the networks, and when their price structures are
similar, then the larger network will be preferred so long as internal calls are priced at a discount.
In that event, we will see a “tipping” of the market, resulting in only one active network.
Formally, a “corner equilibrium” occurs when ni = 1 for some i and nj = 0 for j ≠ i where
ni is the fraction of all users who subscribe to network i.
With higher degrees of network differentiation, a symmetric equilibrium outcome results:
i.e., n1 = n2 = ½. When users have very sharp preferences over networks, there is a large
disutility to compromising on the one that is “further away.” In this case, subscribers who favor
a network with characteristics that lie in between the two alternatives may opt not to subscribe
to either; in that case, n1 + n2 < 1. Of course, a loyal few customers will choose their
favorite network, so that n1 > 0, n2 > 0.
Summarizing, taking a spatial approach to the subscription decision, we find that, under
strategic symmetry, competition between networks for subscribers may “tip” the industry toward
monopoly because of price-induced demand-side scale economies. The consequences of
monopoly are not as bad here as in the usual case, however. Prices of cross-network calls
actually fall as the monopolist eliminates the double marginalization: siim = sijm < pid + pjd.
Consequently, consumer surplus increases as well as industry profits. The sector could perform
much better, nevertheless, since it is still far from achieving the welfare maximum. The question
remains as to whether there are regulatory policies that could further improve upon this
equilibrium without creating additional distortions.
4. RECIPROCITY
Reciprocity holds when each network charges the same fee for terminating traffic that
originates on its rival's network.16 In our notation, reciprocity requires q1 = q2. Reciprocity
16 Reciprocity, in principle, could require networks to charge the same amount for origination, i.e., p1 = p2.
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could be implemented in a number of ways. A third party such as a regulatory agency could set
the mutual termination charge.17 Alternatively, the interconnecting networks could negotiate
a common fee. Finally, one of the networks could unilaterally set the termination fee. The last
two arrangements may not differ by much if one of the networks has a disproportionate amount
of bargaining power in negotiations. It is this situation we model here.
Recall that one part of the double marginalization on cross-network calls is the markup
on termination. If that markup were eliminated from calls traveling in either direction, then both
networks would earn higher profits. This is the reason why the dominant network would set the
common termination charge at cost: q1 = q2 = c. The dominant network, and its rival as well,
would then each earn half of the maximum profit, which is more than half of the smaller Cournot
profits. It does not matter whether the dominant network can choose prices before the rival or
not; either way, it prefers to set both termination fees at cost.18 Note that under reciprocity, the
equilibrium price of an internal call is the same as the price of an outgoing call.19 This implies
that, under the rule of reciprocity, at equilibrium, sii = pi + qi, in which case exact imputation
holds.
Under reciprocity, relative network size also affects the structure of other component
prices. A relatively larger network charges more than a smaller one for outgoing calls. This is
due, in part, to the fact that origination fees increase as the originating network gets larger. This
occurs because a larger network, given its size advantage, commands a higher percentage of the
revenue from outgoing calls.20
Consumers benefit from reciprocity as the drastic reduction in termination charges reduces
prices for cross-network calls, and prices for internal calls remain at stand alone monopoly levels.
Significantly, both networks share in the increased industry profits as double marginalization is
17 Presumably this is how access prices are set in Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1996).
18 Economides, Lopomo and Woroch (1996), op. cit.
19 Ibid.
20 It is also the case that termination fees are decreasing in the relative size of the terminating network. This
tendency, however, is dominated by the effect on origination fees.
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eliminated. Since a first mover otherwise gets a disproportionate share of industry profits, by
reducing the disparity in profits, reciprocity rewards the second mover.
If flows of traffic between two networks are approximately equal, then reciprocity will
equalize their payments for termination. It is this idea that underlies “bill and keep”
arrangements in which networks collect the retail price for outgoing calls and make no payment
to each other for termination. A bill-and-keep system effectively forces termination fees to zero:
q1 = q2 = 0. In fact, if marginal costs of termination are zero (c = 0), reciprocity will also result
in zero termination charges. This property of reciprocity is true only in equilibrium, whereas it
always holds for bill and keep.21
By equalizing termination charges, reciprocity tends to wipe out the price difference
between internal and outgoing calls. As a result, network size vanishes as a factor in user
subscription decisions, and the market no longer “tips” to monopoly. Under the reciprocity rule,
corner equilibria do not exist in the long run game; the symmetric equilibrium is the only full
coverage equilibrium.22 This is because reciprocity eliminates the power of the leading network
to set different prices for termination, and the leader finds it to its benefit to set zero termination
charges, resulting in equal prices for internal and outgoing calls. This rate restructuring sustains
network duopoly which eliminates high prices for outgoing calls. Thus, reciprocity—a conduct
rule—has a structural effect, the encouragement of viable competition.
5. IMPUTATION
A network can reduce a rival's sales of outgoing calls by simply charging a large sum to
terminate these calls. This strategy becomes a “price squeeze” when the network implicitly
charges its own subscribers a smaller amount for the same service, namely, termination of
21 Note that the two policies may have different outcomes if commitment to zero termination fees alters other
prices through a strategic effect.
22 Economides, Lopomo and Woroch (1996), op. cit.
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internal calls. An imputation rule restricts termination fees to be no larger than the implicit price
for termination sold as part of internal calls: sii - pi ≥ qi. Invariably, this inequality is violated
in the industry structures we analyzed above because double marginalization causes the price of
cross-network calls to exceed the price of internal calls: sii < pi + qj. And since termination
charges will be approximately equal under strategic symmetry, qi qj, imputation will not hold
in equilibrium.
To analyze the effectiveness of imputation, we compare two equilibria, both of which
involve a dominant network who sets all of its prices before its rival. Suppose the dominant
network, say network 1, is required by regulation to obey exact imputation: s11 = p1 + q1. In
our discussion of the impact of this rule on price equilibrium, we will take the sizes of the two
networks as given. A general treatment would solve for subscription equilibrium in an earlier
stage. However, we will show that the rule increases profits of the nondominant network and
the surplus of its subscribers, which will have the effect of supporting additional entry.
Imputation restructures the dominant network's prices, lowering both its originating price
and its terminating price while raising its price for internal calls. In effect, (exact) imputation
prevents the dominant network from maintaining relatively high component prices for cross-
network calls while keeping prices for internal calls low—the essence of the calling circle
discount. By imposing imputation, the dominant firm reluctantly raises internal price above the
monopoly level while origination and termination fees fall to satisfy the constraint.
Predictably, imputation reduces profits of the dominant network. It is important to note
that imputation also increases the profits of the second mover. In fact, the incremental profit of
the follower exceeds the reduction for the dominant network so that overall industry profits rise.
The effect of imputation on users depends on which network they choose. The welfare
of subscribers to the dominant network may rise or fall, depending on the relative size of the two
networks and on the demand parameters. That is not the case for subscribers to its rival.
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Because the price of internal calls charged by the rival network does not change, and because its
origination and termination fees fall as a result of imputation, its subscribers are better off.23
Taken together the facts that the rival's profits increase and the welfare of its subscribers
also increases suggest that imputation should encourage entry into an industry dominated by an
incumbent network. A rise in overall welfare is not guaranteed, however, since imputation could
merely function to redistribute wealth from a dominant network's owners and subscribers to its
rivals' owners and subscribers.
Note that in our analysis of reciprocity we had found that the imposition of the rule
resulted in equilibrium prices that also satisfied the criterion of exact imputation. In this section,
we find that the converse is not true, i.e., the imposition of exact imputation does not result in
equilibrium prices that satisfy the criterion of reciprocity.
6. UNBUNDLING
As mentioned in the introduction, it is commonly believed that bundling of network
components can be used for anticompetitive purposes. By bundling services, a network is able
to exclude entrants and forestall rivals by raising the price they pay for inputs needed for their
final services. Bundling is more likely to be adopted by a firm having a dominant position since
market power is needed to sustain such a policy. Indeed, a competitive firm would quickly lose
market share as rivals offered customers more flexible options for purchase of network
components.
A policy of unbundling is seen as preventing this strategy and its welfare harms. By
forcing incumbent carriers to sell individual components separately, and insisting that prices
reflect relative costs (and possibly absolute costs), entrants are able to purchase only the network
services they need. Furthermore, no longer able to commit to selling packages of services,
23 It remains unclear whether aggregate consumers' surplus rises as a result of imputation. The same is true for
total welfare defined as the unweighted sum of consumer surplus and profits.
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dominant carriers must battle rival carriers who could achieve lower costs by specializing in
selected components.
To evaluate the effectiveness of an unbundling policy, we again consider our simple
network model. Now we use as a benchmark the equilibrium in which the dominant network
moves first, setting a single price for internal calls and for origination and termination of cross-
network calls: s1 = p1 = q1. This strategy is called “pure bundling.” A policy of unbundling
would force the dominant firm to set separate prices for each of these three services.
We find that pure bundling increases the profits of the dominant firm. The reason for this
result is not obvious, however, since the dominant firm has a first-mover advantage whether or
not it bundles. Apparently, the benefits of commitment to not competing on individual
components outweigh the costs of reduced pricing freedom.24 In comparison, the effect of pure
bundling on the rival network is indeterminate. It can be shown that bundling raises profits of
the rival when the dominant network is small, but lowers its profits when the dominant firm
serves a large fraction of the market. Nevertheless, combined industry profits will fall with
bundling. Therefore, in many relevant cases, a policy of unbundling will raise the profits of a
rival network at the expense of the dominant firm.
By de-averaging the prices for the dominant firm's services, unbundling allows prices of
components to reflect their specific demand and cost characteristics. Recall that without
bundling, the origination charge exceeds the termination charge, pi > qi, and together their sum
exceeded the internal price, pi + qi > sii. Bundling forces these rates to be equal, thus lowering
the internal price (below the monopoly level), and rebalancing origination and termination
charges. Specifically, unbundling reduces the dominant network's termination charge. This effect
assists a fledgling network by reducing the cost of calls terminated on the dominant network. On
24 This would not be the case for horizontal competition where a first mover could always commit to a uniform
price to all three services, ensuring at least as much profit as under pure bundling.
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net, its subscribers are better off because the price of their outgoing calls falls while the price of
internal calls is unchanged.25
Unbundling restructures prices not only by de-averaging component prices, but also by
altering the dominant network's pricing incentives. When it is able to bundle services, the
dominant network hesitates to cut price to gain market share because it cannot do so selectively.
It cannot resist when it is forced to unbundle. This incentive effect could actually lower the
nondominant network's profits. Nevertheless, since the lot of the rival's subscribers
unambiguously improves, we should expect unbundling to encourage migration away from the
dominant network to new entrants.
7. CONCLUSION
Using a simple model of network competition, we examined the effects of three pricing
rules on equilibrium prices and industry structure. Our preliminary results confirm that the rules
promote deregulation's goal of encouraging entry. This is especially true for reciprocity which
counteracts the tendency toward monopoly by lowering the dominant firm's termination charges.
Imputation and unbundling also encourage duopoly competition but with some reservations. All
three pricing rules redistribute profits from the dominant network to its rival and raises welfare
of the rival's subscribers, encouraging entry by new carriers to the benefit of all subscribers.
In a rush to deregulate telecommunications markets, regulators and legislators had to adopt
policies without a complete understanding of their economic effects. In most cases, expediency
won out over theoretical certainty that the rules would promote entry by new carriers. Nor did
policy makers have the time to explore the rules' possible detrimental effects. For instance, under
reciprocity, rival networks could agree to jointly raise the price of terminating each other's calls.
Potentially, the rule could harm welfare relative to the unregulated outcome. Further, it is known
that imputation will tend to equalize prices charged by direct competitors; in the process, it could
25 Prices for other dominant network services will rise when it must unbundle, and this causes the surplus of its
subscribers to fall. The difference in the effects of unbundling on the two groups of subscribers makes the combined
effect on all subscribers indeterminate; similarly for the effect of total welfare.
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possibly dampen price competition among competing networks. More generally, price restrictions
could work to carriers' advantage by allowing them to commit to prices that otherwise were not
be possible in equilibrium.
As the analysis of our simple model makes clear, the implications of pricing rules are
quite complex in a network industry. A detailed investigation of their performance in more
general settings is called for. This applies as well to the many other rules and regulations that
have been ordered or proposed. The Telecom Act puts into place a plethora of restrictions
governing resale, nondiscrimination, arbitration and separate subsidiaries, among others. Closer
examination of the effects of these provisions is needed, as well as how the various policies
operate in combination to ensure they do not work at cross purposes to one another. After all,
it is the net effect on industry performance of all of the Act's provisions that will be used to
judge its success in the end.
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Figure 1: Network Structure
